Abstract: Software verification has made great progress in recent years, resulting in several tools capable of working directly from source code, for example, SLAM and Astree. Typical properties that can be verified are expressed as Boolean assertions or temporal logic properties, and include whether the program eventually terminates, or the executions never violate a safety property. The underlying techniques crucially rely on the ability to extract from programs, using compiler tools and predicate abstraction, finite-state abstract models, which are then iteratively refined to either demonstrate the violation of a safety property (e.g. a buffer overflow) or guarantee the absence of such faults. An established method to achieve this automatically executes an abstractionrefinement loop guided by counterexample traces [1] .
fashion, yielding lower and upper bounds on the probability/expectation values for the computed abstractions. The bounds provide a quantitative measure of the precision of the abstraction, and are used to guide the refinement process, which proceeds automatically, iteratively refining the abstraction until the interval between the bounds is sufficiently small. In contrast to conventional approaches, our quantitative abstraction-refinement method does not produce counterexample traces. The above techniques have been implemented using components from GOTO-CC, SATABS and PRISM and successfully used to verify actual networking software.
The lecture will give an overview of current research directions in quantitative software verification, concentrating on the potential of the method and outlining future challenges.
